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FCStone Group (FCS) is a publicly held corporation that converted from a co-
operative to a private corporation in 2005, and then converted to a public corpora-
tion in 2007. It is an integrated commodity risk management company that provides
riskmanagementconsultingandtransactionexecutionservicestocommercialcom-
modity intermediaries, end users, and producers. This case study focuses primarily
on the period from the ﬁrst conversion in 2005 to six months after the public offer-
ing in March 2007. Because the ﬁnancial beneﬁts received by each of the cooper-
ative owners of FCS are dependent on the timing of their sale of FCS stock, stock
price information and beneﬁt estimates are provided up to early November 2008.
Background
The primary business objective of FCS is to assist middle-market customers
optimize their proﬁt margins and mitigate their exposure to commodity price risk.
Middle-market customers who ﬁrst organized FCS as a cooperative were grain mar-
keting and farm supply local cooperatives in the American Midwest. It was the
cooperative member-owners of FCS who voted to convert FCS from a federated
regional cooperative—owned and controlled by other cooperatives—to an investor-
oriented business.
FCS consists of four primary business segments: (1) commodity and risk man-
agement services that help customers use futures, options, and other derivative in-
struments through FCS’ Integrated Risk Management Program and use of their fu-
tures commission merchant standing on the major commodity markets; (2) clearing
and execution services that give customers direct access to the trading ﬂoor; (3) ﬁ-
nancial services that assist customers who want to carry commodities through the
use of sale and repurchase agreements; and (4) grain merchandising through a sub-
sidiary grain dealer (FGDI), which includes a leased export elevator and leased rail
cars.
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Organizational history
FCS traces its cooperative origins back to Agri Industries, an Iowa-based re-
gional cooperative whose members were grain-marketing cooperatives. The risk
management execution services tied to the Chicago Board of Trade were ﬁrst pro-
vided to member cooperatives in 1968. This business activity was separated in 1978
into a subsidiary known as Farmers Commodities Corporation (FCC). In 1978, net
revenue equivalent to gross income was US$500,000. In 1986, FCC was spun off
into a separate regional cooperative company with net revenues of US$8 million.
In 2000, FCC acquired Saul Stone, an execution services company with a pres-
ence in all the domestic commodity exchanges, giving FCC the ability to clear all
U.S. exchange-traded commodity futures and options contracts. Net revenue grew
to US$42 million. In 2000, the name became FCStone Group, Inc., but the company
maintained its cooperative business form until the vote to convert to an ordinary cor-
poration on 1 March 2005.
The journey to conversion may have been inevitable if the objective were to
reach FCS’ full potential as a business entity, given its opportunities and the con-
straints of the co-op business model. What has been achieved in size and perfor-
mance of the company and wealth creation for members and stockholders could
not have occurred as a co-op. In hindsight, perhaps the most important question is
whether its co-op members have been better off since the conversion.
The journey to conversion had several important mileposts. An important one
was the hiring of Paul (Pete) Anderson as CEO in 1999. Anderson pointed out
the high growth potential of FCS to the board of directors during his interview for
the position. It was expressed in a vision statement that he prepared for the board,
which outlined many of the potential growth opportunities and strategies that could
and should be pursued. At that point, the vision statementÕs focus was exclusively
on members and how the company could best serve their needs.
The success of that growth strategy over the next three years led to new issues.
Among them were a natural limit on the growth of equity capital generated from
operational proﬁts and a shift in the mix of business from mostly patronage-based
to mostly non-patronage-based. The risk management business model that FCS had
created was useful to many domestic and global businesses beyond the traditional
cooperative members.
Another important milepost was reached in March 2002, when Anderson again
addressed to the board the growth potential and constraints, and laid out some cap-
ital and structural alternatives. Six alternative structures were described, including
continuing the current traditional co-op business model and converting to a pub-
licly held corporation through an IPO. Each alternative was evaluated in terms of
advantages and disadvantages to current customer-member-owners, as well as toVol. 23[2009] 185
the company and its employees. The alternatives were reﬁned and further evaluated
over the next two years with the help of outside consultants. Based on this informa-
tion, the board recommended the conversion and IPO alternative to its members.
The FCS conversion came about by a two-stage process. First, it converted
from a co-op to a private or closely held ordinary corporation (C-Corp), effective
1 September 2004, based on a membership vote taken on 1 March 2005. This vote
explicitly terminated patronage rights as of 1 September 2004, the beginning of the
2005 ﬁscal year, even though the vote was taken six months after the ﬁscal year
had begun. Including common and preferred shares, 96 percent of the votes cast
favored the conversion. Second, it converted from a private to a public corporation
on 16 March 2007. In October 2006, FCS ﬁled for an initial public offering (IPO)
of common stock. The next stockholder vote, 5 December 2006, approved the IPO
and the change from an Iowa corporation to a Delaware corporation. Of the votes
cast, 97 percent favored the IPO.
Demand for the new stock was initially strong. It opened at US$24 and closed
at US$32. A total of 5.865 million shares were sold, with net receipts of US$129.7
million. This new equity was added to the existing equity of US$72.1 million. The
pre-IPO equity consisted primarily of “original” shares converted from co-op eq-
uity with a cost basis of US$10, additional “appraised” shares with a cost basis of
zero, additional “subscription” shares purchased by existing stockholders at US$10
per share in a supplemental subscription offering from April through June 2005,
and Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP) shares purchased in August 2005 by
employees using a portion of their 401(k) assets.
Present business
FCS has evolved from a business that provides commodity exchange execution
services into a diversiﬁed company that focuses on integrated risk management.
Their IPO prospectus described the ﬁrm as follows:
We are an integrated commodity risk management company pro-
viding risk management consulting and transaction execution services
to commercial commodity intermediaries, end-users and producers. We
assistprimarilymiddle-marketcustomersinoptimizingtheirproﬁtmar-
gins and mitigating their exposure to commodity price risk. In addi-
tion to our risk management consulting services, we operate one of the
leading independent clearing and execution platforms for exchange-
traded futures and options contracts. We serve more than 7,500 cus-
tomers, and in the twelve months ended November 30, 2006, executed
50.2 million derivative contracts in the exchange-traded and over-the-
counter (“OTC”) markets. As a natural complement to our commodity186 Journal of Cooperatives
risk management consulting services, we also assist our customers with
the ﬁnancing, transportation and merchandising of their physical com-
modity requirements and inventories. Our net income increased $8.7
million, or 131.8%, from $6.6 million in ﬁscal 2005 to $15.3 million
in ﬁscal 2006, and increased $2.9 million, or 85.3% from $3.4 million
in the three months ended November 30, 2005, to $6.3 million in the
three months ended November 30, 2006.
We began offering commodity risk management consulting ser-
vicestograinelevatorsin1968.Sincethattime,ourbusinesshasevolved
to meet the changing needs of our customers. In response to these
changing needs, we expanded our risk management services from a fo-
cus on agricultural futures and options to a wider array of instruments,
including OTC (“over the counter”) derivatives, and to other commodi-
ties, including energy commodities, forest products and food products.
We operated as a member-owned cooperative until 2005, when we con-
verted to a stock corporation to improve our access to capital and to
facilitate continued growth in our operations.
FCS divides their company into four operating segments:
1. Commodity and Risk Management Services (CRM) is the foundation of the
company, and provides the largest portion of net income. Roughly 117 risk
management consultants assist customers to mitigate their exposure to com-
modity price risk and maximize the amount and certainty of their operating
proﬁts.
2. Clearing and Execution Services (CES) supports CRM by providing lower-
margin clearing and execution services to risk management customers. A
wide array of other customers are further served, including commercial ac-
counts, professional traders, managed futures funds, and introducing brokers
who provide risk management services to retail customers.
3. Financial Services (FS) helps customers ﬁnance physical grain inventories
and other commodity inventories.
4. Grain Merchandising (GM) uses a separate company, FGDI, to function as a
dealer in and manager of physical grain and fertilizer. FGDI links merchan-
disers of grain products through a network of industry contacts, and serves as
an intermediary to facilitate the purchase and sale of grain. On 1 June 2007,
FCS reduced its ownership in FGDI from 70 percent to 25 percent (Agrex, a
subsidiary of Mitsubishi, owns the remaining 75 percent). As a consequenceVol. 23[2009] 187
of this reduced ownership, grain sales are not included as revenues in the
2008 ﬁscal year, as reported in table 1.
Operations and ﬁnancial performance history
From 1999 through 2004, prior to the conversion, FCS grew at a rapid rate in
its two most proﬁtable segments, CRM and CES. That growth continued following
the conversion. Several key metrics are reported in table 1. Net income before taxes
for the CRM segment increased from US$7.9 million in 2004 to US$21.9 million in
2006 and US$45.7 million in 2007. The CES segment saw similar improvements,
with net income before taxes increasing from US$3.4 million in 2004 to US$11.0
million in 2006 and US$9.6 million in 2007.
Measuring size by total revenues or sales can be misleading because revenues
are driven heavily by the buying and selling of commodities, such as grain and
fertilizer, which is a high-volume, low-margin business with volatile prices. For
example, total revenues in 2004 were US$1.6 billion, but declined to US$1.3 billion
in 2007.
A better measure of economic activity is net revenues or sales net of the cost
of commodities sold, which increased from US$105.1 million in 2004 to US$181.9
million in 2006 and US$257.4 million in 2007.
Net income for the total company increased from US$3.6 million in 1998 to
US$6.4 million in 2004, its last year as a co-op. Patronage income averaged about
42 percent of net income (after taxes and before pension adjustment) and cash pa-
tronage refunds averaged about 70 percent in the three years prior to conversion.
After converting from a cooperative corporation to an ordinary private corporation,
net income increased to US$6.6 million in 2005, US$15.3 million in 2006, US$33.3




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































FCS grew rapidly prior to conversion due to its success in offering risk man-
agement services and commodity exchange services through its Integrated Risk
Management Program to an expanded set of customers and commodities beyond
agriculture and its cooperative members.
Sustaining this growth required reliable access to capital, primarily for meeting
the regulatory capital levels required by the Commodity Futures Trading Commis-
sion. It also created the potential for cooperative members to capture the market
value of the company and receive a bigger portion of the income stream beyond the
patronage-based business beneﬁts of cash patronage refunds and equity redemp-
tion of retained patronage refunds. Another potential opportunity was the ability
to award employees and management, including the board of directors, shares of
stock, and stock options.
Conversion Rationale and Proposal Overview
Stated reasons for conversion
Eight reasons for the conversion were identiﬁed, based on a set of statements
made in the 2005 Registration Statement’s letter to members and in the answer to
the question, “Why is the company proposing to restructure?” They are:
1. Improve access to new equity capital. “The company will need signiﬁcant
capital resources to fund ongoing and future activities to stay competitive. If
the business were to continue operating on a cooperative basis, our ability to
raise and retain capital would be limited.”
2. Improve liquidity of current allocated equity and unallocated equity to cap-
ture the market value of ownership. “We believe the proposed restructur-
ing will...enhance the value of the ownership interests in the company by
converting the existing patronage-based relationship with members into an
investment-based relationship.”
3. Improve liquidity of current allocated equity to facilitate equity exchanges
among owners. “We believe that the restructuring may improve the liquidity
of your investment in the company. Currently, common and preferred stock
(the equity class used for retained patronage refunds) may be transferred only
as an incident of membership in the company. After the restructuring, a stock-
holder may transfer its common shares to (a) any other holder of common
shares (unless the transferee would hold more than 5% of the issued and190 Journal of Cooperatives
outstanding shares of common stock after the transfer), or (b) any person
approved in advance by the board of directors.”
4. Distribute non-patronage income directly to owners. “The restructuring will
allow us to make distributions to our stockholders based on their equity inter-
ests rather than their patronage.”
5. Maintain total or majority control by traditional or existing members. “The
restructuring will allow us to retain most aspects of our current system of
corporate governance. We intend to limit the transfer of common stock of
the company to cooperatives and the ESOP. We will also maintain our exist-
ing system of nominating eight Class I board members on a regional basis,
with one Class II board member being nominated by the 12 largest stockhold-
ers and the ESOP, and one Class III board member being nominated by the
other board members. However, after the restructuring, the nominating pro-
cedure will only indicate the stockholders’ preference for certain nominees.
The board of directors will be responsible for selecting all nominees, after
consideration of the stockholders’ preferred nominees.”
6. Provide the ability to form an Employee Stock Ownership Program (ESOP).
“The proposed bylaws will limit the ESOP to ownership of 20% of the new
common stock of the company. Sales of new common stock to the ESOP will
be at its appraised value. Sales of shares of common stock to the proposed
ESOP will allow us to raise capital while capturing certain tax advantages.
In addition, ownership of a percentage of our equity through the ESOP may
assist us in retaining and attracting quality employees, and will align the in-
terests of the employees and the stockholders.”
7. Provide a mechanism to compensate current patron-owners for giving up
patronage-based rights. No speciﬁc justiﬁcation was stated but it was im-
plied that patron-owners were giving up past patronage-based earnings al-
ready earned in the ﬁrst six months of the year, as well as future patronage
earnings. The mechanism used was subscription rights described above.
8. Respond to the growth in non-patronage business relative to patronage busi-
ness.“Growthofourbusinesswithnon-membershasreducedthesigniﬁcance
of our cooperative status and pushed us closer to the boundaries of the deﬁ-
nition of a cooperative under applicable law.”Vol. 23[2009] 191
Conversion proposal description
The initial conversion was from a traditional or open Iowa cooperative to an
Iowa ordinary corporation. The cooperative members were informed of the follow-
ing stock issues and voting rights in the 2005 Registration Statement.
1. Common and preferred stock (i.e., retained patronage refunds) will be con-
verted to new common stock with an equivalent par value [referred to as
“original” shares]. “Currently, members hold Class A common stock or sub-
scriptions, Class B common stock, and preferred stock in the company and
earn patronage-based rights. We will recapitalize by converting the Class A
common stock and subscriptions, Class B common stock, and preferred stock
into newly issued shares of common stock (“new common stock”). If the re-
structuring is effected by approval of the amendments to the articles of in-
corporation and the plan of conversion, you will receive 500 shares of new
common stock issued by the company for each fully paid share of Class A
common stock, $5,000 par value, or 10,000 shares of new common stock for
each fully paid share of Class B common stock, $100,000 par value, and one
share of new common stock for each $10.00 in par value of each preferred
share you hold as of the effective date of the restructuring.”
2. Unallocated equity and residual value above book value will be converted
to new common stock based on the last three years of patronage business
[referred to as “appraised value” shares]. “If the restructuring is approved
by the stockholders, the company will issue a total of 4.31 million shares of
new common stock. This number of shares was determined by dividing the
appraised value of the equity of company, $43.1 million, by $10.00. Each
member’s existing stock ownership represented by common stock or sub-
scriptions, and preferred stock will be converted by distribution of shares of
new common stock at a conversion rate of one share of new common stock
per $10.00 in current stock held. The remaining shares of new common stock
will be distributed based on each member’s pro-rata share of patronage deter-
mined by a formula which considers patronage for the last three ﬁscal years,
including the year ended August 31, 2004. In the case of Class A members,
the formula utilizes the actual patronage paid during the three-year period. In
the case of Class B members, the patronage will be limited to $1.35 per round
turn trade, which is less than the patronage paid to those members. The value
of the stock to be issued with respect to patronage-based rights will be ap-
proximately $26.4 million, which is the $43.1 million appraised value of the
equity of the company less the August 31, 2004 common and preferred stock
value of $16.7 million. This amount represents approximately 5.4 times the192 Journal of Cooperatives
total of all members’ three year deﬁned patronage. Each member’s share will
likewise be 5.4 times its individual three year deﬁned patronage. One share
of new common stock will be issued for each $10.00 of such value. If the
proposal is approved, the distribution of new common stock and subscription
rights is expected to take place on or after March 3, 2005.”
3. Current member-stockholders will be offered the right to purchase additional
common stock at the cost of $10 [referred to as “subscription” shares]. A to-
tal of 100 shares of nontransferable subscription rights were issued for each
200 shares received in the conversion exchange. Each member had the option
to exercise the right to purchase additional shares of new common stock at a
purchase price of $10.00 per share within 60 days after the distribution of new
common stock and subscription rights. The closing was 29 June 2005. Out
of 553 member-stockholders, 56 exercised this right and purchased 174,372
shares of stock for US$1.7 million out of the maximum that could be pur-
chased of 2.15 million shares for US$21.5 million. Only about 8 percent of
the subscription shares were purchased. These new common shares were split
3 for 1 prior to the March 2007 IPO along with all outstanding shares which
reduced the cost basis of the shares to $3.33 per share. As it turned out later,
the IPO was priced at $24 and the stock price has averaged around $50 (prior
to 27 September 2007 3 for 2 stock split), so exercising this right was very
proﬁtable.
4. Voting will shift from one-member, one-vote to voting by shares of common
stock.“Currently,eachmemberofthecompanyislimitedtoowningoneshare
of Class A or Class B common stock. Following the restructuring, each stock-
holder will own the number of shares of new common stock distributed in the
restructuring and any shares of new common stock acquired upon exercise
of the subscription rights. Holders of common stock will continue to vote
on matters such as the election or removal of directors, mergers, sales of all
or substantially all of the assets of the company, dissolution of the company
and amendments to the articles of incorporation. After the restructuring, each
share of common stock will continue to carry one vote, but stockholders will
be able to vote the number of shares of common stock held. As a result, in-
stead of each member having one vote, stockholders with more new common
stock in the company will have greater proportionate voting power after the
restructuring.”
The membership approved the plan of reorganization at a meeting held 1 March
2005, with 96 percent voting in favor. The reorganization was retroactively effective
to 1 September 2004.Vol. 23[2009] 193
IPO proposal description
On 5 December 2006, FCS received 97 percent stockholder approval to convert
from a private to a public corporation and change the charter from an Iowa corpora-
tion to a Delaware corporation. FCS then issued a prospectus for an IPO scheduled
16 March 2007. The proposal had the following components and results:
1. Issued 5.865 million shares at an initial offer price of US$24.00, which re-
sulted in additional net proceeds of US$129.67 million and total outstanding
shares of 18.2 million.
2. Use of proceeds included:
(a) Redeemed 2.159 million shares, or 15% of existing common stock prior
to the offering, at a price of about US$22.32, for a total cost of about
US$48.21 million.
(b) Used the balance to reduce debt and build assets as needed.
3. Notice was made that cash dividends could be paid on stock in the future,
although it was expected they would be less than past dividends paid.
4. Notice was made that a three-for-one stock split was being implemented as a
stock dividend for prior stockholders. That split occurred as of 26 February
2007.
Economic Justiﬁcation
Patron-owner-members organize cooperative businesses for one or more well-
known economic reasons. Co-ops are converted to another business form when
those reasons no longer exist or the advantages of another business form outweigh
the original reasons for forming and operating a cooperative. The economic justiﬁ-
cation of the cooperative business form centers primarily around correcting market
failures, including: (1) reducing or eliminating monopolistic pricing by increas-
ing competition; (2) reducing costs through vertical and horizontal coordination or
integration and achieving economies of size; (3) providing missing services and
information; (4) reducing risk through the pooling of risk; and (5) forming a spa-
tial monopoly operating on a service-at-cost basis. Some co-ops seek to create or
increase market power, and thereby increase market failure for other parties. The
cooperative predecessor to FCS, Farmers Commodities Corporation, was organized
for the ﬁrst three reasons.
Co-ops convert to another business form for a wide variety of reasons. Five
general categories can be identiﬁed, with more speciﬁc behavioral sub-categories
under each. Only the broadest sub-categories are listed. They are:194 Journal of Cooperatives
1. Patron-owner rationale
(a) Improve access to capital
i. Replace or redeem current ownership
ii. Support asset growth
(b) Improve liquidity of allocated and unallocated equity capital
i. Facilitate equity exchanges
ii. Capture market value of allocated equity in exchanges
(c) Improve income distribution
i. Distribute non-patronage income directly to owners
ii. Provide more tax efﬁcient distribution of income to owners
iii. Address high non-patronage income issues
iv. Provide returns to owners who no longer use the co-op as customer-
patrons
(d) Provide more operating ﬂexibility by eliminating contractual patron-
owner delivery requirements
2. Member control rationale
(a) Maintain total or majority control by traditional or existing members
(b) Shift control from members to owners
3. Customer access and treatment rationale
(a) Providecompetitiveaccessforproductsandservicestotraditionalmember-
patron customer base
(b) Provide competitive access for products and services to rapidly growing
non-member customer base
(c) Provide more risky multi-year marketing or supply agreements to a het-
erogeneous customer base
4. Management, employee and director incentives and expertise rationale
(a) Provide improved management and employee recruiting and retention
incentives
(b) Provide improved ﬂexibility to expand director expertise, diversity and
incentives
(c) Provide employee stock ownership plans (ESOP)
5. OtherVol. 23[2009] 195
(a) Provide mechanism to switch claims on income from patronage to own-
ership basis
(b) Provide mechanism to address unique co-op restrictions such as the ma-
jority of business must be with member-patrons
FCS claimed that the primary reasons for conversion were: (1) to gain access
to capital to support rapid growth opportunities in non-member business segments;
and (2) to allow members to participate in the ﬁnancial beneﬁts of non-member
business. Eight reasons were stated in the 2005 SEC Registration Statement, as pre-
viously noted. FCS also said that member customers would still have access to all
their traditional customer services in a competitively priced environment and would
initially have a controlling interest in the company through voting stock ownership
and the board of directors.
Conversionscanbemadeinseveralways,including:(1)convertingco-oppatron-
owner rights into investor-oriented ﬁrm (IOF) ownership rights through the issue of
stock or (2) purchasing co-op patron-owner rights for cash. FCS was converted us-
ing the ﬁrst method, issuing ownership rights in the successor company to members
in exchange for their ceding patron-owner-member rights in the co-op.
Post Conversion and IPO Analysis
Company performance
Up to May 2008, FCS continued to perform at a very high level after the con-
version and IPO. Net revenues and net income continued to grow rapidly. Return
on equity in the pre-conversion period ranged from a low of 9.6 percent in 2002 to
a high of 20.1 percent in 2000. Return on equity in the post-conversion period was
13.2 percent in 2005, 25.9 percent in 2006, 19.2 percent in 2007 and 15.3 percent
through the ﬁrst nine months of 2008, as reported in table 1. The return on equity in
2007 and 2008 is higher than it might appear because solvency measured by equity
to assets more than doubled from 5.6 percent to 12.2 percent between 2006 and
2007.
Following conversion, total book value of equity increased from US$39.8 mil-
lionin2004toUS$49.7millionin2005.Equityfurtherincreasedin2006toUS$58.9
million. After the IPO, total equity increased to US$162.2 million on 31 May 2007
and ended at US$173.7 million in 2007. Total equity grew to US$217.2 million
after the ﬁrst nine months of 2008, as reported in table 1.
A three-for-one stock split was made in February 2007, prior to the IPO, and a
three-for-two stock split was made in September 2007, after the IPO. The post-split
stock price increased signiﬁcantly after the IPO to a high of US$53.25 on 15 Jan-
uary 2008. It ranged from around US$40 to US$50 per share from November 2007196 Journal of Cooperatives
through May 2008, and then trended downward, closing at US$6.16 on 3 November
2008. On 3 November, adverse information about a reported US$25 million dollar
loss on a customer’s account was announced, and the next day the price dropped to
a low of US$2.90, before closing for the day at US$3.69. (See ﬁgure 1 for a history
of prices.)
FCS’marketcapitalizationhasvariedwidely.On15January2008,itwasUS$1.38
billion, based on 27.4 million shares currently trading at about US$50.55 per share
at closing. On 4 November 2008, it was US$101.1 million, based on a closing price
of US$3.69, only about seven percent of the highest capitalization value. The ﬁnan-
cial beneﬁts achieved by the original cooperative owners varied widely based on
when and if they sold their stock.
Figure 1. FCStone Daily Stock Price, 2007–2008
Conversion reasons and achievement
All eight reasons for the conversion (listed above) have been achieved. Access
to equity capital has been increased through sales of stock, which has supplemented
the previous primary source, net income. There have been several stock sales, in-
cluding the subscription rights offered to member-stockholders in 2005 and the
ESOP sales in 2005, and following the IPO in March 2007. Reducing debt and
increasing the equity to asset ratio from 5.6 percent in 2006 to 12.2 percent in 2007Vol. 23[2009] 197
has strengthened the balance sheet. A second public offering in August 2007 did
not add equity to the FCS balance sheet, but instead was used by existing co-op
stockholders to sell some of their stock.
The conversion from a cooperative to a non-cooperative private corporation and
subsequent public stock issue has increased the liquidity of allocated and unallo-
cated member equity by capturing the market value of that equity. The conversion
distributed the pre-conversion appraised value of the ownership to stockholders at
a rate of US$10 per share. The two public stock offerings allowed members to sell
all or part of their original, appraised, and purchased subscription stock for a sub-
stantial gain.
Non-patronage income can now be distributed to co-op stockholders in the form
of dividends on equity. Substantial dividends were paid in 2006 and 2007.
Traditionalco-opmembershavecontrolledFCSthroughasigniﬁcantownership
of voting shares amounting to about 45 percent (as of March 2008). (The level of
sales of Series 2 and 3 stock by cooperative owners since that time is not known.)
More importantly, the current board of directors is comprised primarily of local
co-op managers who have substantial inﬂuence on future nominees to the board,
suggesting that they may continue to hold greater inﬂuence than the proportional
share of voting shares owned by local co-ops. An ESOP was formed, an equity
incentive program implemented, and stock option awards made to the leadership
team of executives and directors after the conversion to a public company in 2007.
These actions may better align the interests of leaders and employees with those of
stockholders.
Member beneﬁts
The ultimate test of a conversion is the beneﬁts that it actually provides com-
pared to the beneﬁts that could have been achieved had the co-op business form
continued. This is difﬁcult to measure because economic conditions and ﬁrm per-
formance are always changing in unforeseen ways, and the basis for income distri-
butionchangesfrompatronageandnon-patronagesourcestosharesofstockowned.
One key metric is the relative ability of co-op member-customers of FCS to
obtain risk management and commodity trading services before conversion com-
pared to after. It appears that member-customers did receive, both before and after
conversion, roughly the same competitive or market-based access to FCS and its
competitors. Therefore, the beneﬁts of being a “customer” of FCS appeared to be
about the same, before and after conversion.
A second key metric is the impact on their investment in FCS and the income
received. Because the co-op members continue to be the biggest block of owners,
measures of interest are (1) the cash dividends received per share (roughly equiv-198 Journal of Cooperatives
alent to the cash patronage refund per unit); (2) the change in stock price; and (3)
the cash received by selling some or all of the stock. Some rough indicators are the
cash ﬂows reported in table 1 and the stock prices reported in table 1 and illustrated
in ﬁgure 1.
FCS proﬁtability, as measured by return on equity and absolute net income,
has grown since the conversion. Compared to other, similar co-ops, cash patronage
rates and redemption rates were relatively high while FCS was a co-op. After con-
version to a private corporation, cash distribution was signiﬁcant, but still a smaller
percentage of net income in 2005 and 2006. However, this should be viewed in the
context of the move toward an IPO, and so includes the 2007 cash ﬂows paid by
FCS directly to co-ops. In 2007, a substantial dividend of US$6.1 million was paid,
of which 90 percent could be assigned to co-op owners and the remainder paid to
the ESOP.
But more signiﬁcantly, 15 percent of co-op equity was repurchased or redeemed
by FCS in the amount of US$48.2 million, of which US$43.2 million went to for-
mer co-op members and the balance to employees and other owners. This alone is
several times the cash ﬂow received by members while FCS operated as a co-op. As
table 2 demonstrates, this ﬁrst redemption had a net realized gain to co-op owners
of US$40.8 million, or about 2.4 times the total book value of all stock (US$16.7
million). All sales after that point increased the multiple of book value received by
co-op owners.
After the 15 percent mandatory redemption to all co-op owners, the remaining
stock was divided into three equal parts, designated as Series 1, 2, and 3. Each
series had its own release date, as noted in table 2. However, each co-op had an
opportunity to sell any or all of its stock in a secondary offering on 3 August 2007.
Asurprisinglylownumberofshares,1.86million,weresoldatapriceofUS$48.24,
creating an additional net realized gain of US$87.4 million. Some co-ops tendered
all their shares, while others tendered none. Hindsight suggests that selling at the
secondary offering was highly beneﬁcial compared to selling when each of the three
series windows opened.
Stock prices varied widely, but because of the low cost basis of US$0.86 per
share, the potential realized gain is substantial, even when shares are marketed at
the lowest price on record. Table 2 provides an accounting of these transactions,
subsequent transactions, and an estimate of total potential net capital gain to co-op
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As noted above, FCS repurchased or redeemed about 15 percent of these shares,
as well as other shares, for around US$22.32 per share. This is a multiple of about
17.3 over cost basis and a gain of US$21.03 per share sold. The net realized gain
for the co-ops totaled US$40.8 million.
More signiﬁcantly, the remaining 85 percent of these shares could be sold at
market prices. Some co-ops took advantage of the second public offering to sell a
part or all of their remaining shares. Over 1.86 million shares were tendered for sale
in a secondary offering on 3 August 2007, generating net proceeds of US$48.24 per
share. This is a multiple of 37.4 over cost basis and a gain of US$46.95 per share.
The total realized net gain from this transaction was US$87.4 million.
On 17 September 2007, there was a three-for-two stock split, reducing the cost
basis on these shares to about US$0.86 per share. If all the remaining original stock
had been sold on 17 September 2007 at the market price of US$48.36, the total
gain would have been around US$650.5 million. Even though only Series 1 stock
was available for sale on that date, many co-ops arranged to “sell short” their Series
2 and 3 at a very advantageous net price prior to the release date. The maximum
realized net gain for the co-op owners of FCS who employed this strategy was
US$778.6 million.
A more conservative strategy is to pretend that each co-op sold their Series 1,
2, and 3 stock on the ﬁrst day that each block was available for normal sale. As
table 2 reports, if sold at the closing price on the ﬁrst day, the total realized net gain
would have been US$517.5 million. The worst-case scenario would have been to
hold all the blocks and sell at the low of the market on 4 November 2008 at US$2.90
per share. The net realized gain would have totaled US$156.0 million to the co-op
community of owners. Even this worst-case scenario is still 9.8 times the original
book value of US$16.7 million [(gain of US$156.0 + book value of US$16.7)/ book
value of US$16.7 = 9.8 times book value].
The conversion of FCS and its IPO has captured a phenomenal amount of mar-
ket value compared to cost or book value. Multiples of this magnitude are unpar-
alleled and unlikely to be matched by any future conversion of a co-op to an IOF
business form. This conversion has added substantial wealth to the farmer co-op-
owners of FCS and, indirectly, to the producer-owners of these co-ops. The funds
have been used for a variety of purposes, including adding assets, reducing debt,
and increasing to producers equity redemptions and other cash ﬂows. These funds
have been made available at a time when the co-op owners are growing rapidly and
in need of capital to ﬁnance this growth.
A third key metric is governance or control. The ownership of FCS most likely
still includes substantial local co-op investment. As of November 2008, the board
of directors still consisted of the same ten local co-op CEOs, and the CEO remains
the same. Two additional directors were added to the board, FCS’ CEO (but not asVol. 23[2009] 201
chairman of the board) and an outside ﬁnancial expert. The nomination process for
new directors speciﬁed in the IPO is designed to keep the board relatively stable
and composed of local co-op CEOs, at least for the next few years.
Conclusions
FCStonehadoverwhelmingcooperativemember-ownersupporttoconvertfrom
a federated regional cooperative to an investor-oriented business. It ﬁrst converted
to a private corporation in 2005 and then converted to a public corporation in 2007.
There were two primary objectives in the conversion. The ﬁrst was to provide sub-
stantial ﬁnancial beneﬁts to its traditional customers, the agricultural cooperative
patron-owner members, while maintaining or improving its risk management ser-
vices. The second was to achieve the full potential of FCS as a risk management
service provider to non-cooperative customers in a broad array of industries beyond
agriculture and on a global scale.
Members strongly supported the conversion and have achieved substantial ﬁ-
nancial beneﬁts while maintaining access to the risk management services as ongo-
ing customers. FCS has gained access to substantial additional capital to ﬁnance its
continued growth into non-member business sectors and regions.
The conversion to a publicly held company has provided signiﬁcant new chal-
lenges to the co-op customer-owners and to the FCS leadership team of executives
and board of directors. Co-op owners had to decide when and if to sell FCS stock
based on their individual situation and expectation for future dividends and stock
price levels. All co-op owners realized a gain of 17 times the book value on the
mandatory redemption of the ﬁrst 15 percent of their stock. With regards to the
remaining 85 percent of stock, some chose to cash out as soon as possible while
others chose to speculate by holding the stock. Those who immediately sold the
remaining 85 percent in the secondary offering in August 2007 realized a gain of
about 37 times the book value. Those who may have sold at the high point of the
market in January 2008 realized a gain of about 58 times the book value. Those
who may have sold at the low end of the market in November 2008 realized a gain
of about 3.3 times the book value. However, the actual distribution of sales over this
time period, August 2007 to November 2008, is unknown.
The board and management team have had to deal with the responsibilities,
expectations, costs, and scrutiny of being a publicly held corporation. Stock prices
have been volatile and declined to low levels at the end of 2008. Some shareholders
are unhappy with the information provided by the company and the performance of
the stock. Several lawsuits were ﬁled against the company in July and August 2008
claiming violations of securities laws. It is not known whether any co-op owners
are among the plaintiffs.